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I.

JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal from a final
order of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County
pursuant to § 78-2-2 (3)(j) Utah Code Ann. (1953).
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The action below concerned Hazeltine Corporation's bad faith
breach of a teaming agreement and subcontract with E-Systems,
Inc./Montek Division ("E-Systems"), under which E-Systems was to
provide Precision Distance Measurement Equipment

("DME/P"), a

subcomponent for a next-generation landing system being developed
by Hazeltine Corporation ("Hazeltine") for the Federal Aviation
Administration ("FAA").

Hazeltine forced E-Systems to implement

out-of-scope design changes to the DME/P, and then prejudiced ESystems' ability to recover the costs of those changes under the
administrative appeals procedure contemplated by the subcontract.
Hazeltine hindered E-Systemsf work on the subcontract by refusing
to provide testing assistance and other support required by ESystems to complete the DME/P. Then, Hazeltine simply walked away
from its obligations under both the subcontract

and teaming

agreement.
Instead of allowing E-Systems to proceed on its breach claims
and claims based upon Hazeltinefs bad faith conduct, the Court
below misconstrued

a "Disputes" clause in the subcontract to

require that E-Systems pursue an inapplicable, inadequate, and
time-consuming

administrative

requisite to E-Systems1

appeal with the FAA

as a pre-

instituting any suit in Utah against
1

Hazeltine.
expressly

That

Disputes

does not

apply

Clause has
to breaches

a limited

purpose and

of the subcontract

disputes solely between Hazeltine and E-Systems.

or

Moreover, the

Disputes clause was wrongly invoked because it cannot sufficiently
remedy E-Systemsf claims against Hazeltine*

Even if the court was

correct to require E-Systems to first pursue this administrative
procedure of the Disputes Clause —

which it clearly was not

—

the court improperly selected to dismiss instead of to stay ESystems1 action in Utah pending exhaustion of that administrative
appeals procedure.

In granting the defendants motion to dismiss

and, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment, the Court
improperly denied E-Systems its rightful choice of forum in the
Utah courts.
III.
1.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Did the Court below err in holding, as a matter of law,

that "the Disputes Clause of the Subcontract requires that the
claims, causes of action and counts set forth in E-Systems1
complaint

be resolved

in accordance with the procedures and

provisions of subparagraphs (b) through (e) thereof"?
A.

Do the procedures at subparagraphs (b) through (e) of
the Subcontract

Disputes Clause apply to E-Systems'

claims for bad faith and breach of the Subcontract which
do not, by definition, "arise under" the Subcontract?
B.

Did the Court below err in holding, as a matter of law,
that

"The

Subcontract

language

of the

Disputes

Clause

is complete, clear, unambiguous
2

of the
and not

subject

to

interpretation"

so as

to

exclude parol

evidence as to the meaning of that clause?
C

Do the procedures at subparagraphs (b) through (e) of
the Subcontract

Disputes Clause, which rely on the

"remedy-granting" provisions in the Subcontract, afford
E-Sytems complete relief for its claims as set forth in
its complaint?
D.

Do the procedures at subparagraphs (b) through (e) of
the Subcontract Disputes Clause apply to disputes solely
between Hazeltine and E-Systems that are not the result
of actions of the FAA and therefore not subject to
appeal to the FAA, including but not limited to: (1)
that portion of E-Systems1 claims against Hazeltine that
Hazeltine refused to certify to the FAA Contracting
Officer pursuant to the Subcontract Disputes Clause and
(2) E-Systems1 claims alleging breach of the Teaming
Agreement, even though the Teaming Agreement

is an

independent contract that has no Disputes Clause, does
not contain any other provision purporting to require
that disputes relating to the Teaming Agreement be
resolved
expressly

in any predetermined manner, and does not
or

impliedly

incorporate

the

Subcontract

Disputes Clause?
2.

Did the Court below err in holding, as a matter of law,

that "The Disputes Clause of the Subcontract has not been rendered
useless and does not fail of its essential purpose"?

3

3.

Did the Court below err in failing to stay the action

below, so as to preserve E-Systemsf choice of forum, as opposed to
granting

the

defendant's

motion

to

dismiss

and,

in

the

alternative, motion for summary judgment?
IV.

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

Issues 1 and 2 address conclusions of law, which are reviewed
de novo for correctness without any special deference to the trial
court.

Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No, 1 v. Jackson

Cattle Co, . 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987); Bailev v. Call. 100 Utah
Adv. Rep. 11, 767 P.2d 138 (Ct. App.), cert, denied. 773 P.2d 45
(1989).

This "correction of error" standard of review applies to

orders granting summary judgment as well as orders to dismiss.
See, e.g. , Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch. . 751 P.2d 248 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988) (summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather
than fact? reviewing court is free to reappraise the trial court's
legal

conclusions).

Issue

3,

concerning

failure

to

stay

proceedings below, is subject to Rule 30(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate procedure, which addresses an appellate court's inherent
power to modify, as appropriate, an erroneous order.
V.

RELEVANT FACTS

Two years ago, Hazeltine Corporation walked away from a
government

contract

with

the

FAA

for

the

development

and

installation of a next-generation airport landing system called a
Microwave Landing System ("MLS") at various airports across the
United States.

Record at 12-13 (Complaint 15 24-27).

4

At first,

Hazeltine stopped work on that contract under the guise of an
unauthorized "study period"; then, Hazeltine informed the FAA that
it considered its contract breached by the FAA and simply stopped
working.
M

9,

Record at 11 (Complaint J 22), 554 (Brimhall Affidavit

13).
Hazeltine

made

this

decision

to

stop work

because

the

alternative of completing the contract would have forced it to
swallow a huge cost overrun.
pressing

ahead was both

The huge cash drain associated with

immediate

and

inevitable.

Although

stopping work on the contract meant that the FAA would terminate
its contract for default (which the FAA ultimately did on August
7, 1989), Hazeltine knew it could forestall any immediate cash
loss and possibly avoid it altogether if Hazeltine could make
stick its allegation of breach by the FAA.
When Hazeltine turned its back on the FAA contract, however,
it also turned its back on E-Systems, its principal subcontractor.
During

the

so-called

"study

period,"

Hazeltine

attempted

to

maintain the pretense of an on-going contractual relationship with
E-Systems.

It sent E-Systems letters instructing it to perform

work that had, in fact, already been performed and suggested that
E-Systems start working on other aspects of the subcontract work
that were either out of sequence or inappropriate at the time.
Record at 555 (Brimhall Affidavit J 13). After a time, however,
Hazeltine even stopped trying to maintain this facade.
For a period now approaching two years, Hazeltine has done
nothing.

Hazeltine has provided to E-Systems no word at all

5

regarding work under the subcontract, nor has it attempted to
invoke any right to terminate the subcontract. 1/

Faced with this

situation, E-Systems sued Hazeltine to recover its damages for
breach of the subcontract and breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing under the subcontract.
No one could have anticipated this sad state of events back
in December 7, 1982, when Hazeltine and E-Systems signed the first
of two "Teaming Agreements" for the purpose of combining their
technical and business resources to forge a "working relationship11
that they hoped would "lead to the maximization of the sale and/or
licensing of the MLS and DME/P equipments as a system throughout
the world." 2/

Record at 4, 92 (Complaint S 6 & Exhibit 2,

Teaming Agreement at f 15) .

Central to both Teaming Agreements

was a requirement that Hazeltine include E-Systems in all key
discussions with the FAA relevant to E-Systemsf product.
at 24-25, 86 (Complaint, Exhibit 1

Record

(1985 Teaming Agreement J 4)

1/
Hazeltine has asserted that the Prime Contract has been
terminated for convenience by the FAA. Record at 674 (Hazeltine1s
Reply Brief, Exhibit 1, Hazeltine Complaint J 186 ("The default
termination should be converted to a termination for convenience
entitling Hazeltine to recover its costs plus profit in accordance
with the termination for convenience clause.")).
If that is the
case, however, Hazeltine is obligated to terminate E-Systems for
convenience under the Subcontract, a step it has thus far been
unwilling to take.
Record at 314 (Complaint, Exhibit 3,
Subcontract at 110-10, "Termination for Convenience of the
Government," FPR 1-8.705-1, June 1964 (contractor must "terminate
all orders and subcontracts to the extent that they relate to the
performance of work terminated by the notice of termination")).
Failure to take action under this clause is a breach of the
Subcontract.
2J
The quotation is contained
Agreement, signed on December 21, 1985.

6

in

the

second

Teaming

and Exhibit 2 (1982 Teaming Agreement 5 2)). Despite Hazeltinefs
unqualified

obligation to involve E-Systems

in all decisions

affecting the MLS Program, over the next eight years after the
formation of the Hazeltine/E-Systems "team," Hazeltine repeatedly
breached this obligation.

Record at 11 (Complaint 55 22, 23),

554-55 (Brimhall Affidavit J 9),
Having forged this ambitious alliance with Hazeltine, ESystems spent the next couple of years developing, at its own
expense, the DME/P component of the MLS. Record at 4-5 (Complaint
55 6-8). The parties agreed that this advance development effort
would give the Hazeltine/E-Systems team an advantage in competing
for the FAA contract.

Both parties also fully understood that the

design resulting from E-Systems1 pre-contract work would be the
basis for the technical and price proposals for the DME/P portion
of the MLS to be supplied under contract to the FAA.

Record at 5-

6, 8 (Complaint 55 8-10, 16), 552-54 (Brimhall Affidavit 55 3, 7).
By January 12, 1984, when the FAA awarded to Hazeltine Contract
DTFA01-84-C-0008 (the "Prime Contractff) for the delivery of 178
Microwave Landing Systems, E-Systems1 design of the DME/P was
essentially complete. Record at 6-7 (Complaint 55 10-12, 15), 552
(Brimhall Affidavit 5 3).
After receiving the award of the Prime Contract, Hazeltine
sent E-Systems a telex, dated January 31, 1984, authorizing ESystems to proceed with work.

Record at 7 (Complaint 5 12). E-

Systems performed under this telex authorization until December
21, 1985, when Hazeltine and E-Systems executed Subcontract No.

7

K25213 (the "Subcontract"). Record at 7 (Complaint 5 13).
with

the

Subcontract,

the parties,

anticipating

Along

a potential

worldwide market of 2,600 DME/P Systems, signed a new Teaming
Agreement

governing

the

current

MLS

effort

as well

as any

follow-on awards or enlargements of the Prime Contract. Record at
7 (Complaint 5 13), 554 (Brimhall Affidavit f 6).
The Subcontract contained a clause entitled "Article XXXVIII
Disputes"

("Subcontract

procedure

to

be

used

Disputes
in

Hazeltine and E-Systems.

Clause")

resolving

setting

certain

forth

disputes

the

between

Record at 345 (Complaint, Exhibit 3,

Subcontract at 112). At the time the Subcontract Disputes Clause
was negotiated, the parties understood that the clause was to
apply only to claims related to in-scope changes and not outright
breaches of the Subcontract.

Record at 553 (Brimhall Affidavit J

5), 579-80 (Hopkins Affidavit 55 2, 3). For in-scope changes, the
Subcontract Disputes Clause contains an administrative appeals
process that involves review of certain subcontractor claims by
the FAA Contracting Officer, who will render a final decision
(subject to appeal) on whether or not the FAA will accept ultimate
liability for the claim.

This process presumes that Hazeltine

will submit to the FAA Contracting Officer only E-Systemsf claims
based upon FAA actions that affected Hazeltine1s Prime Contract
that, in turn, affected E-Systems1 work under the Subcontract.
Record at 579-80 (Hopkins Affidavit J 3).
that

all

other

disputes,

i.e.,

those

The parties agreed

concerning

Subcontract

breaches and claims not based upon FAA actions, would be decided

8

by a court of competent jurisdiction.

Record at 553 (Brimhall

Affidavit 5 5), 579-80 (Hopkins Affidavit H

2, 3).

Hazeltine and the FAA wasted no time in imposing upon ESystems a series of major design changes to the DME/P.

These

changes constituted a breach of the Subcontract because they were
so pervasive that they changed the fundamental character of ESystems1 original design for the DME/P.
17), 554 (Brimhall Affidavit 1 7).

Record at 9 (Complaint 5

To accommodate these changes,

E-Systems was forced to scrap its pre-Subcontract investment in
the original design of the DME/P and incur enormous redesign
expenses ("nonrecurring" costs) that were not contemplated by the
parties

when

the

Subcontract

(Complaint 55 18-21).

was

formed.

Record

at

9-10

These changes also precipitated additional

"recurring" costs, i.e.. those costs associated with manufacturing
each DME/P.

Record at 10 (Complaint f 20).

Hazeltine added to the time and expense of performing the
Subcontract by failing to provide agreed upon support to ESystems.
approval

From June 1988 on, Hazeltine unreasonably withheld
of

First

Article

Test

procedures,

failed

to

make

Hazeltine's inspectors reasonably available to witness required
testing of the DME/P equipment, and generally failed to provide
other support necessary for E-Systems to perform the Subcontract.
Record at 12-13 (Complaint ff
10).

24, 25), 555 (Brimhall Affidavit f

This lack of cooperation was totally unjustified, was not a

result of any action by or encouragement from the FAA, and was not
due to any action or failure to act on the part of E-Systems.

9

In August 1988, Hazeltine unilaterally declared, over the
FAA's strong protest, the unauthorized "study period11 mentioned
above.
8).

Record at 11 (Complaint 1 22), 554 (Brimhall Affidavit J

Initially, this "study period" was nothing more than a ploy

to pressure the FAA into re-negotiating a portion of the Prime
Contract

known

as

the

"turnkey"

effort

installation of the MLS at various airports.

involving

actual

(E-Systems was not

involved in the "turnkey" effort and thus could not possibly
benefit from the "study period" ploy.)

It was during this so-

called "study period" that Hazeltine attempted to disguise the
delay it had imposed on E-Systems by directing it to perform tasks
that were already complete or inappropriate to that stage of the
program.

Record at 13-14 (Complaint 55 25-27), 555-56 (Brimhall

Affidavit 5 13)

Also during this "study period," Hazeltine,

without involving or even informing E-Systems, negotiated with the
FAA regarding restructuring the overall performance obligations of
the Prime Contract, despite the fact that the negotiations clearly
affected E-Systems1
include

E-Systems

Agreement.

obligations and the fact that failure to
in

such

discussions

violated

the

Teaming

Record at 11 (Complaint 55 22, 23), 554-55 (Brimhall

Affidavit 5 9)*
As the relationship between the FAA and Hazeltine continued
to deteriorate, Hazeltine became increasingly less cooperative
with

its

subcontractor

E-Systems.

Hazeltine1s

recalcitrance

became quite pronounced beginning November 30, 1988, the date on
which

E-Systems

submitted

to Hazeltine
10

its

first

claim

for

equitable

adjustment

seeking

an

additional

$5,000,000

for

non-recurring costs associated with the massive design changes to
the DME/P.

Record at 10 (Complaint f 21), 556-57 (Brimhall

Affidavit J5 14, 15).
Hazeltine had instructed E-Systems to prepare its claims
under

the

Subcontract

on

the

basis

of

filing

a

joint

Hazeltine/E-Systems request to the FAA for a price adjustment.
Hazeltine, during the same period, however, secretly negotiated
with the FAA and signed, without E-Systems1 knowledge or consent,
(MM0U,f) , dated December 7, 1988,

a Memorandum of Understanding

which specifically excluded E-Systems1 claims from those claims
that Hazeltine intended to submit to the FAA under the Prime
Contract.

Hazeltine1s

Record at 11-12 (Complaint 55 22, 23).

failure to include E-Systems in the negotiations leading to the
Memorandum
provision

of

Understanding

requiring

discussions

with

violated

E-Systems

the

FAA.

to

Record

be
at

the

Teaming

included
11

in

Agreement
important

(Complaint

5 23) .

Moreover, this MOU itself was contrary to subparagraph (d) of the
Subcontract Disputes Clause, which provides that Hazeltine shall
not enter into any settlement or agreement with the FAA which
would prejudice E-Systems' rights under the Subcontract Disputes
Clause. Record at 346 (Complaint, Exhibit 3, Subcontract at 112).
The MOU

was

also

contrary

to

the direct

representation

by

Hazeltine that the parties would jointly submit such claims.
Having made this undisclosed agreement with the FAA, Hazeltine

11

then unreasonably delayed by five months the submission to the FAA
of the E-Systems1 non-recurring cost claims.
When Hazeltine ultimately did certify E-Systems1 claims for
non-recurring costs on April 20, 1989, however, Hazeltine did not
pass through

a significant

portion

of those claims, thereby

admitting that these portions were due solely to Hazeltine1s
actions as opposed to any actions of the FAA*

Record at 568-70

(E-Systems1 Brief in Opposition, Exhibit A.3.)*

On March 19,

1990, Hazeltine again refused to submit to the FAA a portion of a
subsequent E-Systems claim for recurring costs, presumably because
Hazeltine did not want to attempt to attribute to the FAA the
increased costs associated with that portion of E-Systems1 claim.
In short, by failing to pass through these claims to the FAA,
Hazeltine has by its actions conceded, at least with respect that
portion

of

E-Systems1

claims,

the

inapplicability

of

the

administrative appeals process of the Subcontract Disputes Clause.

Although Hazeltine had numerous opportunities to repair its
relations with the FAA and continue work under the Prime Contract, 3/
it did not take any reasonable steps to avoid the FAA's decision
of August 7, 1989 to terminate the Prime Contract for default.
3/ On November 16, 1988, the FAA issued Modification 0026
to the Prime Contract, which essentially excused Hazeltinefs
previous non-performance and imposed a much-relaxed delivery
schedule. Record at 558 (Brimhall Affidavit IJ 17, 18). Although
E-Systems was prepared to complete Subcontract work under the new
schedule, Hazeltine persisted in its refusal to perform and
responded to FAA by alleging Modification 0026 was a breach of
contract. Record at 558 (Brimhall Affidavit 5 18), 582-83 (ESystems1 Brief in Opposition, Exhibit C).
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Record at 558 (Brimhall Affidavit Jf 18# 19). In fact, Hazeltine
failed to take any action whatsoever to avert termination, even
though it knew that such a termination would seriously impair
E-Systems1 opportunity to receive payment for its work under the
Subcontract and to recover under the Subcontract Disputes Clause
on its pending claims for recurring and nonrecurring costs.
Based upon the

foregoing

litany of bad

faith acts and

Hazeltinefs deliberate abandonment of the Subcontract, E-Systems
sued Hazeltine in Utah court for breach of the Subcontract, breach
of the Teaming Agreement, and breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing contained in both the Subcontract and
the Teaming Agreement.
The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County heard
Hazeltine!s Motions to Stay, or, in the alternative, Motion to
Dismiss, or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment on
E-Systems' claims, and held that the Subcontract Disputes Clause
requires that the claims, causes of action and counts set forth in
E-Systemsf

Complaint

be

resolved

in

accordance

with

the

administrative procedures and provisions of subparagraphs

(b)

through

the

(e) thereof.

In addition, the Court held that:

language of the Subcontract Disputes Clause is complete, clear,
unambiguous and not subject to more than one interpretation;
exhaustion of the administrative appeal procedure of subparagraphs
(b) through (e) of the Subcontract Disputes Clause is a condition
precedent to initiation by E-Systems of any litigation against
Hazeltine in the Utah courts based upon the Subcontract or Teaming

13

Agreement; and the Subcontract

Disputes Clause had

not been

rendered useless and did not fail of its essential purpose.
Upon entering its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law,
the Court granted Hazeltine's Motion to Dismiss and, in the
alternative, granted Hazeltine's Motion for Summary Judgment.
E-Systems filed its notice of appeal of the Court's order on
February 1, 1990; and filed its Docketing Statement on February
15, 1990.
VI.

SUMMARY OF LEGAL ARGUMENT

The central issue in this appeal concerns the interpretation
and proper application of the Subcontract Disputes Clause.
clause

contemplates

that

certain

types

of

disputes

Hazeltine and E-Systems under the Subcontract —

That

between

specifically,

those resulting from FAA action which do not amount to a breach of
the Subcontract —

will be subject to an administrative appeals

procedure that is set forth in paragraphs (e) through (f) of the
Subcontract Disputes Clause.

All other disputes shall be heard

by any court of competent jurisdiction.
The Court below misconstrued the Subcontract Disputes Clause
to require that "the claims, causes of action and counts set forth
in E-Systems1 complaint" against Hazeltine in the Utah courts "be
resolved

in accordance with the procedures and provisions of

subparagraphs (b) through (e) thereof." Record at 767 (conclusion
of law no. 3). Contrary to the Court's conclusion, this procedure
was never meant to address such concerns because it expressly does
not (1) govern breaches of the Subcontract or (2) disputes not
14

otherwise "subject to appeal11 to the FAA Contracting Officer.
Moreover,

the

Subcontract

Disputes

Clause

clearly

was

never

intended to address breaches of the wholly independent Teaming
Agreements.
In

reaching

its

incorrect

conclusions,

the

Court

below

improperly failed to consider the language of the Subcontract
Disputes Clause

in the proper context —

government contracting.

i.e.,

the

field of

The Court also incorrectly invoked the

parol evidence rule to preclude consideration of the evidence that
E-Systems provided to show the actual

intent of the parties

regarding the interpretation of the Subcontract Disputes Clause.
The Court below also erred in requiring E-Systems, under any
interpretation of the Subcontract Disputes Clause, to pursue an
administrative appeals procedure that had "failed of its essential
purpose" as a consequence of Hazeltine's bad faith abandonment of
the Subcontract and its breach of the very terms of the Subcontract
Disputes Clause.

Assuming, arguendo, that the administrative

appeals procedure applies to E-Systems claims —
does not —

the Court below improperly

which it clearly

denied E-Systerns its

rightful choice of forum by failing to stay the proceedings in Utah
pending the outcome of an administrative appeal. For the foregoing
reasons, the lower Courtfs holdings as to these conclusions of law
should be reversed and its order granting Hazeltine's motion to
dismiss and, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment should
be vacated by this Court on appeal.
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VII.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

As a preliminary point, E-Systems notes that the Court below,
although it was not required to do so, entered "findings of fact"
to support

its order granting Hazeltinefs motion to dismiss

pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure ("U.R.C.P") 12(b)(6) and,
in the alternative, motion for summary judgment under U.R.C.P. 56
(c).

Such findings are grounds for reversal if those findings of

fact themselves evidence the existence of controverted and material
issues of fact.

See, e.g.. Mountain States Tele. & Tele. Co. v.

Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered. 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984)
(grant of summary

judgment

precluded where

findings of fact

evidenced material issues of fact) . Such is clearly the case here,
for E-Systems objected to numerous proposed findings of fact on the
basis that they assumed controverted facts. See Record at 717-29,
(E-Systems1 Objections to Hazeltine's Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law).

Specifically, E-Systems denied:

(1) the

clear implication in several findings of fact that E-Systems at
some earlier point in time had agreed with Hazeltine's present
interpretation of the Subcontract Disputes Clause (Record
at 718-21, objections to findings of fact nos. 6, 9, 11, & 13);
(2) that Hazeltine had undertaken an ••analysis" of E-Systems1
claims (Record at 719-20, objections to findings of fact numbers
8 & 12) ; (3) that communications between E-Systems and Hazeltine
referenced

in the proposed findings were "for the purpose of

submitting a certified claim to the FAA under the Contract Disputes
Act" (Record at 719-20, objections to findings of fact nos. 8, 9,
16

& 12); and (4) that the Disputes Clause of the Subcontract "was
intended to work in concert with the disputes procedure of the
prime contract." (Emphasis added.)

Record at 723 (objection to

finding of fact no. 22). All of the above findings, in one way or
another, refer to the underlying intent of the parties with respect
to resolving disputes under the Subcontract, and thereby undercut
any basis for summary judgment under U.R.C.P 56(c) or dismissal
pursuant to U.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 4/
A.

The Court Misconstrued the Subcontract Disputes Clause
to Require that E-Systems1 Claims Against Hazeltine in
Utah Court Be Subject to the Administrative Appeals
Process.

To those familiar with "Disputes" clauses typically used in
government contracts, the Subcontract Disputes Clause does have a
"complete, clear, and unambiguous meaning," but it is not the
meaning adopted by the Court below. Specifically, the Court below
misconstrued paragraph

(a) of the Subcontract Disputes Clause,

which reads:
(a) Any dispute arising under this order which
is not subject to appeal pursuant to
subparagraphs (b) thru (e) below and which is
not disposed of by agreement between Hazeltine
4/ Lockhart Co. v. Equitable Realty. Inc.. 657 P.2d 1333
(Utah 1983) (doubts, uncertainties or inferences concerning issues
of fact must be construed "in a light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment."); Bowen v. Riverton City. 656 P.2d 434
(Utah 1982) (summary judgment is only granted if the record shows
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law); Liquor
Control Commfn. v. Athas. 121 Utah 457, 243 P.2d 441, 443 (1952)
(complaint does not fail to state claim under Rule 12(b)(6) unless
defendant can show that plaintiff "would be entitled to no relief
under any state of facts which could be proved in support of its
claim."); Christensen v. Lelis Automatic Transmission Serv. Inc..
24 Utah 2d 165, 467 P.2d 605, 607 (1970) (same).
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and E-Systems shall be decided in any court of
competent jurisdiction.
Unlike the run-of-the-mill arbitration provision which lumps
together all manner of disputes and requires the parties to a
contract to submit all such disputes to arbitration, 5/ this
5/
Hazeltine argued below that the Subcontract's Disputes
Clause is analogous to an arbitration clause and urged the Court
to apply the same "public policy" considerations applicable to
interpretation of arbitration clauses to determine whether
E-Systems was bound by the Subcontract Disputes Clause to submit
its claims first for consideration under the administrative appeals
process. See Record at 407-12 (Hazeltinefs Reply Brief at 9-14).
Even if the Subcontract Disputes Clause can be compared to an
arbitration clause —
an analogy that E-Systems rejects —
Hazeltine is wrong to suggest that "public policy" requires, or
even favors, an overly-broad reading of the Subcontract Disputes
Clause that would require E-Systems to process its disputes through
an inapplicable administrative appeals procedure.
On the contrary, if "public policy" is at all applicable to
the Court's interpretation of the Subcontract Disputes Clause, it
would weigh against forcing E-Systems to relinquish its right to
proceed in the Utah courts. Article I, Section 11 of the Utah
Constitution provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this State,
by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which
he is a party.
In accordance with the above provision, Utah courts will not
refuse to exercise their jurisdiction "unless factors preponderate
so strongly against trying the case [in Utah that to proceed] would
work a great hardship on the defendant." See Summa Corp. v. Lancer
Indus.. Inc.. 559 P.2d 544 (Utah 1977) (denying motion to dismiss
based upon forum non conveniens); Mooney v. Denver & Rio Grande
R.R. Co., 118 Utah 307, 221 P.2d 628 (Utah 1950) (discretion to
close state court to plaintiff should not be exercised where
underlying purpose is to stall or delay).
Hazeltine relied heavily on Lindon City v. Engineers
Construction Co.. 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1981) to support its argument
18

clause, as explained below, expressly applies only to certain types
of disputes and contemplates that other disputes "shall be decided
in any court of competent jurisdiction."
On

the

question

of which

disputes

are

subject

to the

administrative disputes procedure versus the judicial procedure,
E-Systems reads paragraph (a) of the Subcontract Disputes Clause
to modify the parties' common law right to resort to the courts
only with respect to that subset of disputes "arising under this
order."

The Subcontract Disputes Clause is silent as to disputes

not "arising under the order," and therefore does not purport to

that the Subcontract Disputes Clause was tantamount to an
arbitration clause under which E-Systems had waived its right to
a judicial proceeding.
Lindon City considered whether a state
statute requiring arbitration of disputes violated Article I,
Section 11 of the Utah Constitution, set forth above. Although
the court in Lindon City identified an exception to Article I,
Section 11 applicable when a party intentionally waives the
ordinary and usual judicial remedy to which it is entitled under
the Utah Constitution, the court stressed that such a waiver must
be expressed in "the most unequivocal terms." Lindon City. 636
P.2d at 1074.
Even if the arbitration analogy were valid in this case —
which it is not — it would be premature to apply the Lindon Citv
"exception" to the right of a party to proceed expeditiously in
Utah courts before determining what types of disputes E-Systems
actually agreed to submit to the administrative disputes resolution
process. As discussed below, the Subcontract Disputes Clause does
not mandate that all disputes are subject to the administrative
appeals procedure; some disputes "shall be decided by any court of
competent jurisdiction." If E-Systems is correct that the claims
raised in its complaint fall into the category of disputes that are
subject to judicial resolution, E-Systems obviously will not have
"unequivocally" waived its right to proceed immediately in the Utah
courts on those claims.
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alter E-Systems1 state constitutional right to seek a judicial
resolution of its disputes in the Utah courts. 6/
Disputes "arising under the order" that are also "subject to
appeal pursuant to subparagraphs (b) thru (e)" of the Subcontract
Disputes Clause will be handled under the administrative appeals
procedure thereof. Conversely, disputes "arising under the order"
that are not "subject to appeal . • • shall be decided by any court
of competent jurisdiction."
As described more fully below, whether a dispute is subject
to the administrative appeals procedure depends upon whether the
parties have established contractually-prescribed remedies that
are adequate to deal with the situation —

for example, a clause

that allows for a day-for-day adjustment to the delivery schedule
resulting

from

buyer

imposed

delays.

In

this

sense,

the

administrative process presumes that the dispute does not rise to
6/
Hazeltine argued below that "If E-Systems' argument is
correct that the phrase 'arising under1 is a limitation on the
types of actions encompassed by this provision, the result of the
argument is that actions that do not arise under the Subcontract
may not be brought in a court." Record at 614-15 (Reply Brief at
11-12). Hazeltine then argues that "this Court need not apply such
an illogical distinction between which actions that may and may not
be brought in court." Id.
Hazeltine's solution to what it
disingenuously characterized as an "illogical" result was to simply
pretend that the words "arising under the order" have no meaning
or significance whatsoever.
E-Systems, however, never argued for the "illogical"
interpretation of the Subcontract Disputes Clause suggested by
Hazeltine.
E-Systems did argue that the Subcontract Disputes
Clause, by referring only to disputes "arising under the order,"
carves out only a subclass of disputes and modifies the usual
disputes procedure at common law — i.e.. resort to the courts —
only for that subclass of disputes. For disputes not "arising
under the order" the parties are free to pursue the usual judicial
remedy. This interpretation is not "illogical."
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the level of a breach of the contract, because the parties
contemplated a situation in advance of contracting and established
a contractual mechanism adequate to resolve the situation.

When

the contractually-prescribed remedies fail to adequately address
the situation —

as they have in this case due to Hazeltinefs

outright repudiation of the Subcontract —

the administrative

appeals process simply cannot apply.
1.

The Subcontract Disputes Clause Does Not Govern the
Claims Asserted by E-Systems Against Hazeltine in
Utah Court Because That Clause Applies Only to That
Subset of Disputes "Arising Under This Order."

Hazeltine convinced the Court below to adopt Hazeltinefs
overly-broad

reading

of

subparagraph

(a) of

the

Subcontract

Disputes Clause, which completely overlooks the limiting phrase
"arising under the order." 7/

It was contrary to the applicable

rules of contract interpretation, however, for the Court to have
accepted this interpretation of the clause because Hazeltinefs
interpretation intentionally fails to acknowledge or give meaning
to the phrase "arising under this order," which, as discussed
below, is a phrase that has a well-established meaning in the field

2/
Hazeltine contends that this subparagraph of "[t]he
Disputes Clause only permits disputes that are fnot subject to
appeal1 pursuant to the Disputes Clause to be decided by a court."
Hazeltine's Motion to Dismiss at 9.
"All other disputes,"
Hazeltine argues, "are required to be settled in accordance with
the disputes resolution procedure set forth in the Disputes
Clause." Id. This reading of Subcontract Disputes Clause reads
out the phrase "arising under this order" which has a specialized
meaning in the context of government contracting, and which was
inserted by the parties for the express purpose of limiting the
scope of the Subcontract Disputes Clause.
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of government contracts. £/

See, e.g., Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing

Corp.. 454 F. Supp. 258, 266 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd. 601 F.2d 609 (2d
Cir. 1978) (New York law requires interpreting contract so as to
"make every part of a contract effective"); Looney v. Great
American

Ins.

Co..

71

F.R.D.

211,

214

(E.D.N.Y.

1976)

("construction which neutralizes any provision of a contract should
never be adopted"); cf. Cornwall v. Willow Creek Country Club. 13
Utah 2d 160, 369 P.2d 928, 929 (1962) (Utah courts may not "add,
ignore,

or

discard

words

in

the

process"

of

contract

interpretation) .
It is critically important, therefore, to understand the
significance of the phrase "[a]ny dispute arising under this order"
as used in paragraph (a) of the Subcontract Disputes Clause.

The

Subcontract Disputes Clause that E-Systems and Hazeltine agreed
upon is a variation on the "standard" Disputes Clause which has
long been used in virtually every government contract.

Over the

years, many of the terms and phrases used in this "standard"
Disputes Clause, including the phrase "arising under the contract
(or subcontract or order)" have come to have specialized meanings
within

the

field

of

government

contracts.

Cf.

Washington

Metropolitan Area Trans. Auth. v. Buchart-Horn. Inc.. 886 F.2d 733,
735 (4th Cir. 1989) (there is "considerable guidance in making that
determination

[as to which disputes fall within the Disputes

8/ The Subcontract Disputes Clause provides that it shall be
"governed by law of the state of New York." See Record at 345
(Complaint at Exhibit III, Contract, Clause No. XXXVIII, para, g.)*
Accordingly, New York law is cited, where appropriate, on points
of contract law.

22

clause] for the Dispute clause 'is a standard feature of government
contracts, and arguments concerning [its] scope and appropriate
function are not novel, •" citing Rohr Industries v. WMATA. 720 F.2d
1319, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
Disputes

"arising

under

a contract"

technically

do not

constitute breaches of the contract (which are sometimes referred
to in government contract parlance as "disputes relating to a
contract") because they fall within the general scope of the
contract, are anticipated by the parties in advance of contracting,
and

are

meant

to

be

handled

under

special

remedy-granting

provisions within the contract. 9/ The Courtfs failure to consider
this specialized meaning of the phrase "arising under this order,"
as it is used in the field of government contracts, in construing
the

meaning

of

the

Subcontract

Disputes

Clause

constitutes

9/
Whether a change to the contract requirements constitutes
a "breach" depends upon "what should be regarded as having been
fairly and reasonably within the contemplation of the parties when
the contract was entered into." Freund v. United States, 260 U.S.
60, 63 (1922); Air-A-Plane Corp. v. United States. 187 Ct. CI. 269,
275 (1969) ("The basic standard . . . is whether the modified job
was essentially the same work the parties had bargained for when
the contract was awarded. . . . [T]here is a cardinal change if the
ordered deviations •altered the nature of the thing to be
constructed.1") E-Systems has alleged that, even though some of
the individual changes required under the Sxibcontract may be
susceptible to adjustment under the Subcontract Disputes Clause
administrative appeals process, the cumulative number and sheer
magnitude of the changes constitute a "cardinal change" or breach
of the Subcontract which entitles E-Systems to sue Hazeltine for
breach of Subcontract in "any court of competent jurisdiction."
See, e.g. , Edward R. Marden Corp. v. United States. 194 Ct. CI. 799
(1971).
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reversible error* 10/

See Restatement (Second) Contracts § 202

(technical terms and words of art are given their technical meaning
when used in a transaction within their technical field).
The phrase "arising under this contract [or order]/1 when used
in a Disputes Clause of a government contract or subcontract, has
a restrictive meaning that

is well-established

in government

contract law. United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384
U.S. 394, 407 (1966).

In Utah Construction. the Court recognized

the distinction between a true breach of contract and disputes
"arising under [the] contract", i.e.. a dispute for which there is
a pre-established "contract adjustment provision" within the terms
of the contract that will allow the parties to make an equitable
adjustment for certain anticipated changes or situations. 384 U.S.
at 401-02; see also Washington Metropolitan Area Trans. Auth..
supra (a disputes clause "concerning a question of fact arising
10/ Consideration of the way that the phrase "arising under
the contract" is used in the field of government contracting is no
different from consideration of evidence of "trade usage" in
commercial contracting. Under New York law, evidence of trade
usage is clearly not subject to the "parol evidence rule." See
N.Y. Com. Code, §§ 1-205, 2-202 (McKinney 1964 & Supp. 1990)
(Comment 1 (c) to § 2-202 "definitely rejects" the requirement that
a court find the language of a contract ambiguous before evidence
of trade usage may be introduced). In fact, the Uniform Commercial
Code of New York "specifically requires the written language of the
parties1 agreement to be construed consistently with applicable
trade usage." Federal Express Corp. v. Pan American World Airwavs.
Inc.. 623 F.2d 1297, 1302 (8th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted). By
allowing evidence of course of dealing and trade usage, the court
merely places the contract in the context in which it was executed.
As aptly noted in Chase Manhattan Bank v. First Marion Bank, 437
F.2d 1040, 1046 (5th Cir. 1971) (dispute over standby and
subordination agreements), w[c]ertainly the parol evidence rule
does not preclude evidence of the course of dealings or usage of
trade, for such evidence merely delineates a commercial backdrop
for intelligent interpretation of the agreement."
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under this contract.'1 • . . merely establishes an] administrative
procedure for resolving quarrels.

Other contractual provisions,

by granting a contract administrator authority to afford some
remedy

for the quarrel must

in effect

confer

jurisdiction)?

Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Grace Line. Inc., 416 F.2d 1096# 1102-03
(D.C. Cir. 1969) ("That phrase —
- has a lengthy

history,

•arising under this contract1 -

throughout

which

it has commanded

widespread acceptance as an unyielding limitation on administrative
reference to disputes that can be fully remedied under some
stipulation of contract . . . . [However, resort to the disputes
clause procedure need not be made] unless [the claim] is subject
to full administrative vindication under some other provision of
the contracts.ff).
Hazeltine incorrectly asserted below that the advent of the
Contract

Disputes

"abolished"

Act of 1978 ("CDA") rendered

the well-established

distinction

obsolete or

between

disputes

"arising under" and disputes "related to" a contract (the latter
constituting

actions

for

breach).

See

Record

at

610-12

(Hazeltine1s Reply Memorandum at 7 - 9). Hazeltinefs contention
is untrue. 11/
11/ Prior to enactment of the CDA, the distinction between
disputes "arising under" the contract and disputes involving breach
of contract was determinative of the jurisdiction of the agency
boards of contract appeal (these boards had jurisdiction to
consider disputes "arising under" the contract, but could not
consider breach of contract claims). The CDA, inter alia, expanded
the jurisdiction of the agency boards of contract appeal to hear
both kinds of disputes and this change was subsequently reflected
in the standard government contracts disputes clause. The CDA also
requires the contractor to submit all claims, including breach
claims, to the government contracting officer for a final decision.
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The specialized definitions of the phrases "arising under a
contract" and "related to a contract," as used in the context of
government contract law certainly have not been "abolished" by the
CDA.

In fact, the "arising under" versus "related to" distinction

survives in the current version of FAR 52.233-1 "Disputes" (Apr.
1984), the Disputes Clause that is required by federal regulation
to be used in virtually all government prime contracts. 12/
FAR §§ 33.203 & 33.214
contained

in

the

See

(text of FAR § 52.233-1 "Disputes" is

Record

at

707-08

(E-Systemsf

Supplemental

Memorandum, Exhibit H)).
Government contractors still rely heavily on the "arising
under" versus "related to" distinction in paragraph (h) of FAR §
52.233-1 Disputes, which sets forth the contractor's obligation to
proceed with contract work pending a dispute.

This paragraph

states "[t]he Contractor shall proceed diligently with performance
of the contract, pending final resolution of any request for
relief, claim, or appeal or action arising under the contract, and
Since the passage of the CDA, the nature of a dispute has been less
frequently litigated (simply because both types of disputes are
handled in essentially the same way and the boards of contract
appeal no longer have to consider the nature of this dispute before
asserting jurisdiction over the dispute). As discussed below,
however, the distinction between the disputes "arising ixnder" and
disputes "relating to" a contract remains important.
12/ Hazeltine argued below that the FAA's alleged breach of
Hazeltine's contract did not permit Hazeltine to "ignore the
disputes resolution procedures of the prime contract." See Record
at 644, (Hazeltine's Reply Brief at n.7).
This argument
conveniently overlooks the fact that the disputes provision in the
FAA-Hazeltine contract expressly applies to "all disputes arising
under or relating to" the contract, see Record at 710, while the
Subcontract Disputes Clause only applies to "disputes arising under
this order." In short, Hazeltine is comparing apples to oranges.
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comply with any decision of the Contracting Officer."

This

language allows a contractor to stop work if the dispute involves
a breach of contract by the Government. 13/
If the Government has a compelling need to require the
Contractor to proceed

even when the Government

breaches the

contract, then the FAR directs the use of "Alternate I" to the
Disputes Clause. Alternate I simply modifies paragraph (h) of the
Disputes Clause to require the Contractor to proceed pending final
resolution of any dispute "arising under or related to" the

13/ The official comments published with the final, post-CDA
version of the Disputes Clause included the following:
A major change from the regulations and interim Disputes
clause, in use since March 1979, concerns the extent of
the contractor's obligation to continue performance of
work. Prior to the passage of the Contract Disputes Act,
a contractor, pursuant to the Disputes clause then in
effect, was in the event of a dispute arising under the
contract, obligated to continue performance in accordance
with the contracting
officer's decision pending
resolution of the dispute. On the other hand, if the
dispute arose out of the contract, or in breach of the
contract, there was no obligation to continue work. The
interim Disputes clause expanded the contractor's
obligation to continue performance to include disputes
arising out of, or in breach of, the contract as well as
under the contract. The final Disputes clause published
here returns the situation to the pre-Contract Disputes
Act obligation.
Under the Disputes clause and the
accompanying regulations, the contractor is obligated to
continue work only if the dispute arises under the
contract. It is recognized, however, that in unusual
circumstances the performance of some contracts may be
vital to the national security or public health and
welfare so that performance must be guaranteed even in
the event of a dispute arising out of, or in breach of,
contract. In these unusual cases, procuring agencies may
provide for a change to the Disputes clause to assure
continuation of the work.
45 Fed. Reg. 31035 (May 9, 1980).
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contract.
I).

Record at 706-08 (FAR 33.214 & FAR 52.233-1, Alternate

Thus, the obligations placed on a government contractor vary

significantly depending upon whether the Disputes Clause employs
the phrase "arising under or related to11 or simply "arising under
the contract."
Despite

its

arguments

to

the

contrary,

this

important

distinction is not lost upon Hazeltine. The disputes provision in
Hazeltinefs contract with the FAA does not invoke "Alternate I,"
but only requires Hazeltine to "proceed diligently" with contract
performance pending resolution of disputes arising under the FAA
contract.

See Record at 688, 710 (E-Systems' Supplemental Brief

at 5 & Exhibit I). Faced with what it considered to be a no-win
situation under the prime contract, Hazeltine has attempted to
invoke its right to stop work under the prime contract by arguing
that the FAA breached the contract so as to relieve Hazeltine of
its obligation to proceed under the Disputes Clause.
at

674

(Hazeltine's Reply

Brief at Exhibit A,

See Record

Complaint

in

Hazeltine v. United States at 5 183). Given Hazeltine1s position
vis-a-vis the FAA, where Hazeltine is asserting that it does not
have to proceed with work on the prime contract because its dispute
with the FAA does not "arise under the contract," it is remarkable
that Hazeltine would even suggest that the distinction between
disputes "arising under" a contract and disputes "related to" a
contract has been "abolished" for the purposes of government
contract law.
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In sum, if the object of the parties was to draft the
Subcontract Disputes Clause to govern breaches of the Subcontract,
they needed only to invoke the phrase "arising under or related to
the order11 in place of the phrase that, in fact, was agreed upon- "arising under this order.11

As a consequence of the parties1

choice of the more restrictive phrase "arising under the order" in
lieu of the all-inclusive phrase "arising under or relating to the
order," E-Systems' claims based upon breach of the Subcontract are
simply not subject to the administrative appeals procedure set
forth in the Subcontract Disputes Clause.
2.

E-Systems, in the Alternative, Raised the
Possibility of More Than One Reasonable
Interpretation of the Subcontract Disputes
Clause, Thereby Precluding Application of the
Parol Evidence Rule.

The interpretation of the clause explained in the preceding
section is obviously not the same interpretation adopted by the
Court below, but it is a reasonable one. At the very least, then,
the parties' use of the phrase "arising under the order" to modify
"any disputes" in paragraph (a) of the Subcontract Disputes Clause
raises the possibility of more than one reasonable interpretation
of the Subcontract Disputes Clause, i.e.. an ambiguity.

See Walk-

In Medical Centers. Inc. v. Breuer Capital Corp.. 818 F.2d 260,
263 (2d Cir. 1987) (Under New York law, H[a]n •ambiguous1 word or
phrase

is one capable of more than one meaning when viewed

objectively by a reasonably intelligent person who has examined
the

context

of

the

entire

integrated

agreement

and

who

is

cognizant of the customs, practices, usages and terminology as

29

generally understood in the particular trade or business," quoting
Eskimo Pie Corp, v. Whitelawn Dairies. Inc., 284 F. Supp. 987, 994
(S.D.N.Y. 1968)); IBM Pouahkeepsie Employees Federal Credit Union
v. Cumis Insurance Society. Inc.. 590 F. Supp. 769, 772 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (if contract term is susceptible to "at least two fairly
reasonable meanings,11 then parol evidence is permitted).
By failing to acknowledge even this much, the Court below
compounded its error by failing to consider all evidence that ESystems proffered regarding the intent of the parties with respect
to the scope of the Subcontract Disputes Clause.

There is no

question that E-Systems submitted evidence sufficient to raise a
material issue of fact regarding whether the phrase "arising under
this order" was used intentionally by the parties for the express
purpose of limiting the application of the Subcontract Disputes
Clause. See, e.g. . Holbrook Co. v. Adams. 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah
1975) (only one sworn statement is necessary to dispute averments
on the other side and to preclude summary judgment).
As evidence supporting its contention that the Subcontract
Disputes Clause was crafted to apply only to disputes falling
short of breaches of the Subcontract (i.e.. only disputes "arising
under the order"), E-Systems introduced affidavits of two of its
employees,

Gary

L.

Hopkins,

Associate

General

Counsel

for

E-Systems, and Rodger M. Brimhall, E-Systems1 Senior Contracts
Administrator,

both

of

whom

actually

participated

in

the

negotiations with Hazeltine over the wording of the Subcontract
Disputes Clause.

Both men attested to the fact that the language
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ultimately

agreed

upon

indeed

was

intended

to

restrict

the

application of the disputes resolution procedure to only those
disputes "arising under the order" as that phrase is customarily
applied in the context of government contracting.
Mr. Hopkins1 affidavit states:
The disputes article was structured to cover those
claims "arising under" the subcontract as that
terminology is used in Federal contracting.
Further, with respect to such claims, namely those
arising under the contract, only those claims caused
by some direction, change or other action of the
Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) through
Hazeltine to E-Systems were to be subject to the
applicable provisions outlined in subparagraphs (b)
through (e) of ARTICLE XXXVIII.
See Record at 579-80, Affidavit of Gary L. Hopkins, Brief in
Opposition at Exhibit B at paragraph 3.
Mr Brimhall1 s affidavit corroborates E-Systems' interpretation
of the Subcontract Disputes Clause:
During negotiations over the subcontract, an issue
arose regarding the scope of Hazeltinefs proposed
"Disputes" clause.
That issue was ultimately
resolved by Hazeltine1s and E-Systems1 agreement to
use a non-standard disputes clause that was intended
to set up a procedure for the resolution of disputes
"arising under" the subcontract, as that phrase is
applied in traditional government contracts.
Subcontract K25213, Art. XXXVIII (a). All other
disputes between E-Systems and Hazeltine were not
intended to be subject to the government contracts
appeals procedure and could be asserted as claims
in "any court of competent jurisdiction." Id.
See Record at 553 (E-Systemsf Brief in Opposition, Exhibit A,
Affidavit of Rodger M. Brimhall, at paragraph 5).

In sum, both

Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Brimhall recall that Hazeltine and E-Systems
used the phrase "arising under" the Subcontract to limit scope of
disputes subject to the administrative appeals procedure.
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As is demonstrated above, these recollections are entirely
consistent with the way that the phrase

"arising under" the

contract or subcontract is typically used, and continues to be
used, in disputes provisions in government contracting. Moreover,
had E-Systems been provided with even a limited opportunity to
conduct discovery in this case, it is certain that E-Systems could
have provided even more support for its contention that E-Systems
and Hazeltine, both experienced government contractors, intended
to use those "terms of art" in a manner consistent with their
understanding of those terms in the context of government contract
law.
3.

The E-Systems1 Claims Do Not "Arise Under" the
Subcontract Because the Remedy-Granting Provisions
in the Subcontract Cannot Adequately Address Those
Claims.
a.

The Subcontract's Remedy-Granting Provisions
Are Very Limited in Scope.

The claims asserted by E-Systems in Utah court are breach
claims that do not "arise under the order" because they clearly are
not susceptible to complete relief under any "remedy-granting"
clause in the Subcontract.

While E-Systems concedes that there

are remedy-granting clauses in the Subcontract, including the
"Changes" clause (see Record at 305, Subcontract K25213, Standard
Form 32, Clause No. 2), the "equitable adjustments" contemplated
by that clause only extend to Government-directed, in-scope changes
to the specifications, changes in place of delivery or method of
shipment.

It is patently evident that E-Systemsf allegations of

out-of-scope changes to the Subcontract requirements, bad faith and
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breach of contract relating both to the Subcontract and the Teaming
Agreement are far broader than the limited types of matters that
reasonably can be addressed by this narrowly drawn clause or the
remedies available under that or other Subcontract clauses.
The "Termination for Convenience" clause in the Subcontract
also fails to address in a meaningful way E-Systems' claims for
breach of the Subcontract and the Teaming Agreement.

Like the

"Changes" clause, the "Termination for Convenience" clause has a
limited purpose and it cannot be used by a prime contractor as an
all-purpose shield against subcontractor claims for breach of
Subcontract.

See, e.g., Roaerson Aircraft Corp. v. Fairchild

Indus. . Inc. . 632 F. Supp. 1494 (CD. Cal. 1986) (applying New York
law to allow breach damages for anticipatory lost profits relating
to a sales contract to supply aircraft parts notwithstanding fact
that contract contained a termination for convenience clause). In
Roaerson Aircraft, the court held that the termination provisions
of the contract were structured to "force Fairchild to elect either
to terminate . . . the contract for its convenience . . . thereby
requiring a speedy close-out of the contract and the payment of
Rogerson's termination costs and settlement expenses . . . or to
terminate the contract for default."

632 F. Supp. at 1499.

court held that Fairchild's wrongful termination

The

for default

constituted a breach of the contract and prevented Fairchild from
limiting damages to those available under the termination for
convenience clause,
778 (Ct. CI. 1961)).

id. (citing Klein v. United States, 285 F.2d
Similarly, Hazeltine has abused any rights
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it had under the Termination for Convenience clause by failing

—

for nearly two years — to provide for the "speedy close-out of the
contract and the payment of [E-Systemsf] termination costs and
settlement expenses" under the Subcontract.

Consequently/ E-

Systems right to recovery against Hazeltine cannot be limited only
to that which E-Systems would have obtained under that clause.
b.

E-Systems Is Entitled to Recover Damages for
Breach of the Subcontract and the Teaming
Agreement That Are Unavailable Under Any
Remedy-Granting Provision of the Subcontract,

Under generally accepted principles of contract law and New
York contract law in particular, E-Systems is entitled to recover
its "reliance damages" for Hazeltine1s breach of the Subcontract
and the Teaming Agreement.

Reliance damages are damages for

amounts which plaintiff "has been induced to expend on the faith
of the contract, including a fair allowance for his own time and
services."

United States v. Behan, 110 U.S. 338, 345 (1884).

Reliance damages encompass any expenditures made on the part of the
plaintiff

"in

'essential reliance1

upon defendant's promise,"

Gruber v. S-M News Co., 126 F. Supp. 442, 446 (S.D.N.Y 1954),
including expenditures in preparation for and partial performance
of the contract.

See, e.g.. Freund v. Washington Square Press,

Inc. . 34 N.Y.2d 379, 357 N.Y.S.2d 857, 860
Restatement

(Second)

of

Contracts

§

349

(1974); gee also

(1981)

(reasonable

expenditures in necessary preparation or partial performance of
contract recoverable); 5 Corbin on Contracts § 1031 (1964 & Supp.
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1990) (fl[e]xpenditures in preparation and part performance are
recoverable as an alternative means of gains prevented"). 14/
E-Systems was induced to spend substantial sums in essential
reliance upon Hazeltinefs broken promises made under both the
Subcontract and the Teaming Agreement —

amounts which cannot be

recovered in an administrative appeal to the FAA.
expended

approximately

$11,579,000

in

contract

E-Systems has
design

and

development, $893,000 in building 10 DME/P first article units;
$6,167,000 in building production DME/P systems and related spares.
Due to Hazeltine's abandonment of the Subcontract, these costs
might not be recovered if Hazeltine is unsuccessful in litigation
against the FAA over the propriety of the default termination.
Other costs that E-Systems expended in reliance on Hazeltine's
good faith performance of the Subcontract and Teaming Agreement
that cannot be recovered through an administrative appeal even if
Hazeltine

succeeds

at

overturning

its

default

termination,

including $1,125,000 in pre-contract development costs, $2,318,000
in company-funded design and development, $680,000 in unabsorbed
burden/overhead, $231,000 in attorneys fees, and additional intracompany expenses associated with E-Systemsf attempts to work its
way out of the problems that Hazeltine created by its outright
repudiation of the Subcontract.

14/Additionally, if the Court finds, as the facts indicate,
that Hazeltine acted in bad faith, Hazeltine will be estopped from
asserting any contractual limitation on consequential damages, and
E-Systems will be entitled to recover lost profits as well. See,
e.g., Long Island Lighting Co. v. Transamerica Selaval. 646 F.
Supp. 1442, 1458 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) and cases cited therein.
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Moreover, because Hazeltine has failed to properly terminate
and close out the contract, E-Systems has been forced to absorb the
carrying cost of the entire Subcontract inventory for a period
approaching two years.

This interest expense is $2,675,000 and

growing, and it is not recoverable from the Government under the
termination for convenience that Hazeltine now seeks in U.S. Claims
Court.

See, e.g., United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co.,

329 U.S. 585 (1947) (interest may not be assessed against the
government unless permitted by statute or contract provision); FAR
31.205-20
unallowable

"Interest
cost

and

under

other
government

financial

costs"

contracts);

FAR

(interest
31.205-42

"Termination costs" (cost principles in FAR Subpart 31.2 applicable
to termination situations).
Consequently, if E-Systems were to pursue the administrative
appeals process and seek reimbursement under the remedy-granting
clauses of the Subcontract, any remedy under such clauses clearly
would be insufficient to address E-Systems' damages for breach of
Subcontract and Teaming Agreement.
both a breach

of the Subcontract

Because E-Systems has alleged
and breach of the Teaming

Agreement and can demonstrate its breach damages are unavailable
under the any remedy-granting clause in the Subcontract, the Court
below was incorrect to require E-Systems to first pursue an
administrative remedy prior to seeking relief in the Utah court.
E-Systems is clearly entitled to recover all its reliance
damages resulting from Hazeltine's abandonment of the Subcontract
and Teaming

Agreement

not just those that are theoretically
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"available"

under

the

remedy-granting

provisions

of

the

Subcontract. As the Court said in United States v. Behan. 110 U.S.
338 (1884):
It does not lie, however, in the mouth of the party,
who has voluntarily and wrongfully put an end to the
contract, to say that the party injured has not been
damaged at least to the amount of what he has been
induced fairly and in good faith to lay out and
expend (including his own services) . . . .
Id. at 345.

As the Behan Court further stated, "the wilful and

wrongful putting an end to a contract, and preventing the other
party from carrying it out, is itself a breach of contract for
which an action will lie for the recovery of all damages which the
injured party sustained."

Id. at 346 (emphasis added); see also

Polyalvcoat v. C.P.C. Distributors. Inc.. 534 F. Supp. 200, 203 n.3
(S.D.N.Y.

1982)

advertising

(plaintiff

products

in

entitled

reliance

to

upon

recover

sums

subsequently

spent

breached

contract); Mefer S.A.R.L. of Paris v. Naviaaro Maritime. 533 F.
Supp. 337, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (plaintiff entitled to recover
"foreseeable

losses

and

expenses"

incurred

as

a

result

of

defendant's breach).
In sum, Hazeltine has improperly invoked the Subcontract
Disputes Clause to further delay E-Systems' recovery of the sums
that

E-Systems

expended

in

reliance

upon

Hazeltine's broken

promises under the Subcontract and Teaming Agreement. By accepting
Hazeltine's overly-broad interpretation of the Subcontract Disputes
Clause, the

Court below not only misapplied the Subcontract

Disputes Clause, it inadvertently abetted Hazeltine's delaying
tactics by wrongly directing E-Systems to pursue an administrative
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remedy that was both inapplicable and incapable of providing ESystems complete relief.
Even Under Hazeltine!s Interpretation of the
Subcontract Disputes Clause, the Claims Asserted By
E-Systems Against Hazeltine Are Not "Subject to
Appeal" Under the Administrative Appeals Procedure.

4.

Putting aside the question of whether the clause only modifies
E-Systems1 right to resort to the Utah courts for disputes "arising
under the

order," the Court's

rulings below

cannot

even be

supported based upon Hazeltine!s proffered interpretation of the
Subcontract
"arising

Disputes

under

the

Clause.
order"

Hazeltine
and

reads

ignores the phrase

paragraph

(a)

of

the

Subcontract Disputes Clause to mean that only those claims "not
subject to appeal . . . shall be heard by any court of competent
jurisdiction."

See Record 407 (Hazeltine1s Brief at 9) (emphasis

added).
In adopting Hazeltine's interpretation of the Subcontract
Disputes Clause, the Court erred by failing to examine each of ESystems1 claims to determine whether those claims were, in fact,
actually "subject to appeal" to the FAA Contracting Officer. Since
the FAA Contracting Officer only has authority to rule on disputes
resulting from FAA action, the Court below should have determined
whether the claims asserted by E-Systems in Utah court resulted
from FAA action.

This is a question that is not capable of

determination as a matter of law.
The administrative appeals process set forth in paragraphs
(b) through (e) of the Subcontract Disputes Clause anticipates that
the FAA Contracting Officer will issue a final decision on the
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merits of the dispute which, in turn, may be appealed to either the
Department of Transportation Board of Contract Appeals ("DOTBCA")
or the U.S. Claims Court, the category of disputes that are
"subject

to appeal" necessarily

can be no broader than the

authority of the FAA Contracting Officer to render such decisions
or the DOTBCA's or U.S. Claims Court's jurisdiction to consider
related appeals.
The

applicable

section

of

the

federal

regulations

circumscribing the Contracting Officer's ability to render final
decisions on disputes involving subcontractors, set forth at FAR
44.203 (c), reads as follows:
Contracting officers should not refuse consent to
a subcontract merely because it contains a clause
giving the subcontractor the right of indirect
appeal to an agency board of contract appeals if the
subcontractor is affected by a dispute between the
Government and the prime contractor.
Indirect
appeal means assertion by the subcontractor of the
prime contractor's right to appeal or the
prosecution of an appeal by the prime contractor on
the subcontractor's behalf. This clause may also
provide that the prime contractor and the
subcontractor shall be equally bound by the
contracting officer's or board's decision.
The
clause may not attempt to obligate the contracting
officer or the appeals board to decide questions
that do not arise between the Government and the
prime contractor or that are not cognizable under
the clause at § 53.233-1, Disputes.
The above regulation clearly limits the types of disputes
"subject to appeal."

In fact, the Subcontract may not purport to

require the Contracting Officer to render decisions on any prime
contractor/subcontractor disputes unless that dispute "arise[s]
between the Government and the prime contractor," i.e., stems from
government action which affects the contractor or results from a
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dispute between the prime contractor and the government. 15/ Cf.
Grumman

Ohio

(incorporation

Corp. v,

Dole. 776

of the standard

F.2d

338

government

(D.C. Cir. 1985)

disputes clause in

subcontract does not impose on the Urban Mass Transportation
Administration any obligation to provide a forum for disputes
involving a contract to which it is not a party; "it makes no sense
whatever in the real world to force UMTA to preside over battles
in which the federal interests are minimal at best.1').
Although E-Systems1 claims for recurring and nonrecurring
costs under the Subcontract, in the main, resulted from direction
of the FAA and are arguably "subject to appeal" in the sense that
they are claims for which the FAA may ultimately be liable, 16/
E-Systems has leveled allegations of specific acts of bad faith and
breach of contract by Hazeltine that cannot,

in good faith,

reasonably be attributed to the direction of the FAA.

For such

claims, resort to the administrative appeals procedure, which
entails E-Systems seeking recovery from the FAA, would serve no

15/ Likewise, the U.S. Claims Court has no jurisdiction to
consider such prime contractor/subcontractor disputes. £f. RollsRoyce, Ltd.. Derby. England v. United States. 364 F.2d 415 (Ct. CI.
1966) (Claims Court lacked jurisdiction over breach of contract
counterclaim by third party intervenor against private plaintiff,
even though the counterclaim involved common questions of fact,
because it did not seek to enforce a claim that was part of the
plaintiff's original action against the United States).
16/ As previously noted, however, the cumulative effect of
the changes went far beyond the original scope of the Subcontract
and thereby constitute a cardinal change to, and thus a breach of,
the Subcontract. See, e.g., Wunderlich Contracting Co. v. United
States. 173 Ct. CI. 180 (1965). As explained above, E-Systems is
entitled, under the Subcontract Disputes Clause, to have its breach
claims heard in "any court of competent jurisdiction."
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purpose other than to delay E-Systems1 recovery from Hazeltine for
its valid claims against Hazeltine.
Perhaps the clearest indication of error on the part of the
Court below was its failure to recognize E-Systems' right to
proceed against Hazeltine in Utah court to recover that portion of
E-Systems1 two separate claims for nonrecurring and recurring costs
which Hazeltine refused to certify and submit to the Contracting
Officer

pursuant

to

subparagraphs

Subcontract Disputes Clause.

(b)

through

(e)

of

the

Even Hazeltine was not prepared to

certify to the FAA that portion of the claim was "subject to
appeal."
Other clear examples of disputes "not subject to appeal" are
E-Systems1 claims relating to Hazeltine's breach of the Teaming
Agreements, dated December 7, 1982 and December 21, 1987.

These

Teaming Agreements are independent contracts that have no disputes
clause, do not contain any other provision purporting to require
that disputes relating to the Teaming Agreement be resolved in any
predetermined manner, and do not expressly or impliedly incorporate
the Subcontract Disputes Clause. 17/

17/ Hazeltine has argued that E-Systems1 claims based upon
breach of the Teaming Agreements should be dismissed because,
"although [these] counts are superficially based on the 1985
Teaming Agreement, they specifically related to claims arising
under the Subcontract." See Record at 412 (Hazeltinefs Brief in
Support of Motion to Dismiss at 14, n.2) E-Systems has alleged
that its incurred significant expenses, including over $1 million
in pre-contract design and development expenses, in reliance on
Hazeltinefs promises under the Teaming Agreement. This claim is
not "superficially" based upon any claim "arising under" the
Subcontract.
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B.

The Trial Court Erred in Concluding, As a Matter of Law,
That the Subcontract Disputes Clause Had Not Failed of
Its Essential Purpose Because That Determination
Inherently Involves Questions of Fact.

Even if the Subcontract Disputes Clause can reasonably be read
to apply to the claims raised by E-Systems below, the court below
was incorrect to force E-Systems to pursue an administrative appeal
with the FAA because the Subcontract Disputes Clause has "failed
of its essential purpose," which is to allow for an expeditious
administrative disposition of those disputes "arising under the
order" in the course of Subcontract performance. Cf. United States
v. Triple A Machine Shop, Inc.. 857 F.2d 579

(9th Cir. 1988)

(disputes clause presupposes an on-going contractual relationship
and specific contractual remedies). 18/
The New York contract law doctrine of "failure of essential
purpose" relieves a party from pursuing an otherwise exclusive or
limited remedy if the circumstances existing at the time of the
agreement have changed to such a degree that the enforcement of the
remedy would deprive the plaintiff of a substantial benefit of that
remedy.

19/

In

such

cases, the

limited

remedy

is

simply

18/ It is irrelevant that the disputes clause survives
"completion."
19/ Under government contract law, a similar exception to
the contractor's obligation to proceed under the Disputes clause
exists where the contractor alleges that the government has
essentially deprived the contractor of the administrative appeals
process.
See J.A. Jones Construction Co. v. City of Dover v.
General Electric Co., 372 A.2d 540 (Del. Super. 1977); Patton
Wrecking & Demolition Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority. 465 F.2d
1073 (5th Cir. 1972) ("It may be that the contracting officer . .
. so clearly reveals an unwillingness to act to comply with the
administrative procedures in the contract that the contractor or
supplier is justified in concluding that the procedures thereby
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disregarded

and the full arsenal

available to the plaintiff.

of breach remedies becomes

See, e.g.. Computerized Radiological

Services. Inc. v. Svntex Corp,. 595 F. Supp. 1495, 1510 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) , aff'd in part and rev'd in part. 768 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1986) ,
citing Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson Ltd.. 23 N.Y.2d 398,
404-05, 244 N.E.2d 685, 688, 97 N.Y.S.2d 108, 113 (1968).
There is no question that Hazeltinefs bad faith acts work to
deny E-Systems a substantial benefit of the administrative appeals
process. 20/ The paramount impediment to E-Systems1 recovery under
the administrative appeals process stems from Hazeltine's election
to stop work under the prime contract —
precipitated

the FAA!s

termination

a decision which directly

for default

of the prime

have become 'unavailable'.") Cf. Rohr Industries. 720 F.2d at 1323
(contractor's claim for breach of contract based upon failure to
comply with disputes clause did not have to be processed through
disputes clause procedure).
20/ Hazeltine's bad faith conduct alone precludes it from
asserting any rights under the Subcontract Disputes Clause even if
that clause does not lffail of its essential purpose11 because
•• 'persons invoking the aid of contracts are under an implied
obligation to exercise good faith not to frustrate the contracts
into which they have entered.11' See Lowell v. Twin Disc. Inc. .
527 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1975) (citing Grad v. Roberts, 14 N.Y.2d 70,
75, 248 N.Y.S.2d 633, 637, 198 N.E.2d 26, 28 (1964)). E-Systems
has alleged facts sufficient to make a prima facie claim that
Hazeltine has breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing of both the Subcontract and the Teaming Agreement. This
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which is present in all
contracts, is a promise not to act so as to deprive the other party
of the benefits of the contract. See, e.g.. Kirke La Shelle Co.
v. Paul Armstrong Co.. 263 N.Y. 79, 104 N.E. 163 (1933).
Hazeltine's willful deviation from the terms of the Subcontract,
therefore, should preclude it from attempting to enforce any
provision in that Subcontract. See, e.g.. Filner v. Shapiro. 633
F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying New York law to preclude
application of doctrine of substantial performance due to willful
breach of contract by defendant).
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contract.
Court

Although Hazeltine is attempting in the U.S. Claims

to have the termination

termination

for convenience,

for default

until

this

converted

into a

is accomplished

the

administrative appeals procedure is essentially foreclosed. 21/
With only a few exceptions, a contractor is not entitled to payment
for undelivered work under a defaulted contract. See, e.g.. Jules
Teitelbaum. Trustee in Bankruptcy for Victory Electronics. Inc..
ASBCA No. 12885, 70-1 BCA \

8210 at 38,164, 38,175 (defaulted

contractor not entitled to equitable adjustment for additional
testing of radio sets because the testing was incomplete and
undelivered at time of default termination); Tuff-Kote Dinol. J.P.
Partiridae, Inc.. ASBCA Nos. 28961, 30058, 87-3 BCA 5 20,042 at
101,462—101,463 ("general rule is that where a contract has been
properly terminated for default, no recovery may be had for the
expenses of either changed or unchanged work incurred prior to
termination with respect to undelivered supplies or services").
Hazeltine argued below that if it is successful in convincing
the U.S. Claims Court to reverse the FAAfs decision to terminate
the prime contract for default, E-Systems then may avail itself of
the administrative appeals process.

Record at 617.

If it is not

21/ Hazeltine argued below that E-Systems should not be
allowed to disregard the administrative appeals process because it
would expose Hazeltine to the "disastrous" possibility of
inconsistent judgments, [cites] E-Systems has the right to prove
breach of the Subcontract by Hazeltine and to recover its damages
from Hazeltine. If Hazeltine can prove that its breach of the
Subcontract resulted from FAA actions and, in turn, recover from
the FAA, then that is good for Hazeltine. If it cannot recover
from the FAA, however, E-Systems is still entitled to compensation
from Hazeltine for Hazeltine1s breach of the Subcontract. In short
there is no real possibility of "inconsistent judgments."
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successful, E-Systems can later file suit against Hazeltine in the
Utah courts and later seek the same remedy it seeks now. 22J
these alternatives, Hazeltine disingenuously

Given

suggests that E-

Systems1 rights under the disputes clause are Mnot affected fit
all.11

Id.

The point of the doctrine of "failure of essential

purpose/1 however, must relate to the actual intent of the parties
regarding the purpose of the clause, and in this case the purpose
of the clause was to provide an expeditious remedy in the context
of an on-going contractual relationship.

No matter what the

outcome of Hazeltine!s litigation in U.S. Claims Court, that
purpose has been frustrated.
Under the doctrine of frustration of essential purpose, the
central question is whether

,M

an exclusive remedy, which may have

appeared fair and reasonable at the inception of the contract, as
a result of later circumstances operates to deprive a party of a
substantial benefit,'11 and under New York law a substantial delay
in supplying a remedy can iust as effectively deny the benefit of
a remedy as a total inability to provide the remedy.

See, e.g.,

Cayuga Harvester v. Allis-Chalmers Corporation. 465 N.Y.S.2d 606,
611, 95 A.D.2d 5 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
Whether

Hazeltinefs

actions

deprived

E-Systems

of

a

substantial benefit of its agreement is a question of fact which
precludes summary

judgment.

In Cayuga Harvester, the court

22/ It may take several years before the U.S. Claims Court
renders a decision on Hazeltine's action against the FAA.
Hazeltine overlooks the fact that the statute of limitations may
bar subsequent action by E-Systems at that time.
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reversed a summary judgment on the issue of whether a "repair or
replace" remedy clause failed of its essential purpose. The court
stated, "ordinarily, whether circumstances have caused a flimited
remedy to fail of its essential purpose1 is a question of fact for
the jury and one necessarily to be resolved when proof of the
circumstances occurring after the contract is formed."

The court

held that the plaintiff's allegations of delay constituted a prima
facie showing that the remedy clause failed of its essential
purpose, even absent bad faith or wilfully dilatory conduct on the
part of the defendant.

Cayuga Harvester. 465 N.Y.S.2d at 611-12;

see also Erie County Water Auth. v. Hen-Gar Constr. Corp., 473 F.
Supp. 1315 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (New York failure of essential purpose
doctrine depends upon whether party is deprived of the substantial
value of its bargain; this is a question of fact which precludes
summary judgment).
Hazeltine cannot dispute the fact that its termination for
default imposes a substantial delay on the administrative process.
If Hazeltine is not successful in reversing the termination for
default, it will possibly foreclose the administrative appeals
process altogether. Even if Hazeltine is ultimately successful in
reversing its termination for default, however, E-Systems still may
not obtain any benefit from the administrative appeals process
because the FAA had raised affirmative defenses against Hazeltine
that, if successful, may bar any recovery by E-Systems. See Record
at 664 (Defendants1 Answer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint,
filed October 20, 1989, at para. 189, Hazeltine Corp. v. United
46

States, No. 425-89C

(CI. Ct. Aug. 9, 1989) (FAA asserts that

Hazeltine's claims against the FAA are barred by estoppel, waiver,
release, or accord and satisfaction)).
In

light

of

Hazeltine!s

absolute

repudiation

of

the

Subcontract, Hazeltine's termination for default, and the FAAfs
claim to affirmative defenses against any claims asserted by
Hazeltine, the administrative

appeals process that

M

may have

appeared fair and reasonable at the inception of the contract"
certainly no longer appears fair and reasonable. At a minimum, the
Court below erred in failing to allow E-Systems to show, as a
factual matter, that Hazeltine1s bad faith conduct had made the
remedy

too

difficult

to

achieve.

See

Tareyton

Electronic

Composition, Inc. v. Eltra Corp.. 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1064 (M.D.N.C.
1977) (New York law precludes summary judgment where party alleging
breach of contract is seeking to avoid the exclusive or limited
remedy; plaintiff entitled to show the defendant's own bad faith
act that precludes recovery under that limited remedy).
C.

The Trial Court Improperly Denied E-Systems Its
Rightful Choice of Forum by Failing to Consider a
Stay of E-Systems1 Action Pending the Determination
Under the Administrative Appeals Procedure.

The Court below dismissed E-Systems1 claims for breach of the
Subcontract and Teaming Agreement because in the Court's view ESystems had not complied with the administrative appeals procedure
of the Subcontract Disputes Clause.

See Conclusion of Law No. 4.

("Exhaustion of the appeal procedure . . . is a condition precedent
to initiation by E-Systems of this litigation against Hazeltine.") .
E-Systems is unable to submit its claims against Hazeltine to the
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FAA for determination under the administrative appeals procedure
because such an appeal would require that E-Systems certify that
n

the amount requested accurately reflects the contract adjustment

for which the contractor believes the Government is liable."
Federal Acquisition
however,

E-Systems

Regulation

33.207.

has submitted

Pending

to the FAA

See

this appeal,

its claims for

recurring and non-recurring costs based upon FAA-directed changes
to the Subcontract, and these claims are currently pending in the
U.S. Claims Court.

Even if E-Systems recovers on these claims,

however, E-Systems will not be made whole for Hazeltine's breach
of the Subcontract and Teaming Agreement.
Whether this Court decides that E-Systems should first proceed
with all or part of its claims through the administrative appeal
procedure, E-Systems should be allowed to retain its choice of
forum in the Third Judicial Court of Salt Lake County for all
claims not resolved

by the administrative

appeals procedure.

Pursuant to Rule 30(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
this Court may "modify or otherwise dispose of any order of
judgment appealed from."

This matter should be reversed and

allowed to proceed in the Third Judicial District Court. However,
in the event that this Court affirms the decision of the trial
court, the trial court's order should be modified to stay the
present action by E-Systems in order to preserve E-Systems1 choice
of forum pending the resolution of any administrative appeal.
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VIII.

CQNCIffglOy

Instead of allowing E-Systems to proceed with its breach of
contract action in the Utah courts, the Court below misconstrued
a "Disputes" clause in the Subcontract to require that E-Systems
pursue an administrative appeal to seek recovery for its breach of
contract damages from the FAA as a prerequisite to E-Systems'
instituting an action against Hazeltine in the Utah courts. There
is absolutely no basis under the express terms of the Subcontract,
or under any other legal principle, for this conclusion.
First, the Disputes clause in question expressly does not
apply to breaches of the Subcontract.

Second, even if it did

purport to cover such claims, E-Systems1 claims in the Utah court
concern its dispute with Hazeltine, not any dispute between the FAA
and Hazeltine that, in turn, affects the Subcontract.

Under the

New York contract law which governs the Subcontract, E-Systems is
entitled to reliance damages for breach of the Subcontract and the
Teaming

Agreement

inventory

including

carrying

costs,

recoverable from the FAA.

pre-contract
and

other

development

damages

not

costs,

otherwise

This remedy is unavailable under the

administrative procedure contemplated in the Disputes clause.

It

makes no sense to force E-Systems to go through the motions of
complying with an administrative disputes process that E-Systems
can now show will be insufficient to remedy its claims against
Hazeltine.
courts,

a

Finally, E-Systems has a right to a forum in the Utah
right

that

may

be unjustifiably
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thwarted

in the

subsequent "race to the courthouse" after the futile administrative
appeal is exhausted.
Accordingly, the lower Court's holding should be reversed and
its order granting Hazeltine's motion to dismiss and, in the
alternative, motion for summary judgment should be vacated by this
Court.

The Court should remand with instructions to allow E-

Systems to proceed with

its lawsuit

or, alternatively,

with

instructions to stay E-Systems1 suit pending exhaustion of the
administrative appeal to the FAA Contracting Officer.
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